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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This action was brought for damages for injuries 
suffered when the plaintiff wets thrown to the ground 
by the sudden movement of defendant's unattended 
automobile as the plaintiff was attempting to alight 
therefrorn. 
DLSPOSITION IN LOWER GOUR T 
Both parties moved for summary judgment at the 
- I. -
pre -trial c0Ltf 1.: re nee, and filed n1emorandas in 
support of their rnotions. The Court granted the 
plaintiff 1 s motion, ruling that the defendant was 
negligent, that defendant 1 s negligence was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, that 
plaintiff was not negligent, and the the Utah "guest11 
statute did not preclude the plaintiff from recovery. 
This appeal by the defendant is only from the last 
finding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
-while the facts set forth in Appellant's Brief 
are mainly accurate, the plaintiff does not accept the 
defendant's conclusions, and deems it necessary to 
point out additional facts relevant to the issue before 
the Court. 
At the invitation of the defendant, Mrs. Andrus 
accepted a ride in the defendant's automobile to a 
local restaurant for a sandwich. Upon finishing their 
meal, the parties returned to the plain.tiff's home, 
arriving there at approximately 9:30 o'clock P· m. 
After vi:-;iLF"~ in Llic r_·ar for about five ininutes, 
the p'1rt1es opened the <loors and began to get out. 
Although the defendant had left the engine running, 
the car in gear in drive positioa, and had failed to 
properly set tbe b;:md brake, the car was stationary 
as they began their exit. On previous occasions the 
plaintiff had n;quned no assistance when leaving the 
defendant 1 s automobile, although this night, the 
defendant decided to aid her. However, she did not 
tell Mrs. Andrus to stay in the car, nor is there any 
evidence that she issued some warning or caution. 
Deposition (R. 52), page 10; Answers to Interrogatories 
(R. 8-10), Nos. 7 to 10, 18, and 21. 
In tbe Appellant 1 s Brief relevant portions of the 
plaintiff 1 s deposition are set forth detailing the events 
that then transpired. Mrs. Andrus stated that after 
opening her door and facing tLe Cll1tside, with one foot 
in the car and the other out {although she could not 
ren1err1ber whether or not her right foot had touched 
d). ··.~ nd "itb. her hand on the door handle, the the groun , cc. ". 
-4-
c:ar lJP!-,'.i.Lll to rull forward. The defendant, at the 
rear of tf1e Cd r h y this tirne, heard the plaintiff yell, 
"The car ls rolling!" Deposition (R. 52), pages 7 
to 9, and 11; Answers to Interrogatories (R. 9), No. 
10. Referring tu sequence, Mrs. Andrus further 
testified: 
and 
"A. . .. And i.t just seerned :.ike when I 
was getting out of the car, it started 
to roll, and I hung on. I hung on to 
the door. 11 Depositio~i. (R. 52), page 
7, lines 15 and 16. 
11 Q. Did you try to get yourself back in the 
car and close the door? 
A. Yes, I did. I tried to pull myself in. 
See, I held onto that there door, you 
know. It had a catch on there, you 
know> to open the door, and I held 
onto that to try to pull myself back 
in; and it just kept a rolling until it 
th rowed j·ne off, off balance. n 
In considering the testimony of Mrs. Andrus 
regarding that, moment, it is evident that just as she 
began rising fro1n the ::;eat, the car began rolling 
forward_ ~;he was far ennngh outside the car that she 
w::is KllC!CkE.d ofl l1C:LL.l11c1:.~, and, \.\hile tryring to pull 
herself hctck iw:;1de, wets thrown to the ground, Mrs. 
Andrus was not certain as to how far the car rolled 
before she was thrown and injured, although she 
estirnated the car went some fifty feet before coming 
to a stop against a parked auto1nobile. Deposition 
( R. 52), page 11. 
At the time of the accident Mrs. Andrus was 74 
yea rs old, lived <JJ ong, enjoyed good health, and was 
able to care for herself. Because of the broken hip 
and broken shoulder suffered in the accident, it is 
unlikely that she will ever walk normally again. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A GUEST AT THE TIME OF 
THE ACCIDENT AND INJURY WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF TBE UTAH GUEST STATUTE. 
At comm0~1 law a person wronged by another wa~ 
perm_itted open acce!:is lo the courts to obtain redress 
fo:r the injuries or d;_i_rn~-1.ges suffered. This ancient 
dufriors u1 Cir, cfi<irt to pf'rfc:ct the recourse available 
Lo the citizens of this StatP. Art. I, § 11, Constitution 
of Utah provides: 
'rALl courts sh;:ill be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in ~1is person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be ad-
rr1in is te red without denial or unnecessary 
delay; .. ,'' 
While our Court has not been faced with the 
question of the constitutionality of the Utah guest 
statute, the courts of many of our sister states have 
considered this problem with the result being diverse 
theories of the meamng and intent of the framers of 
our c011stitutions. So, while there is considerable 
case law on the subject, there has been a complete 
failure to a uniform 01· general rule to rise out of the 
mass of judicial cunfusiull. 111 A. L. R. 1011; C. J. S., 
Con. La\v, ~ 709, p. l2i7, n. 41. 
The pLuntiff does not here suggest that the Utah; 
guest statute abides the constitutional guaranty of 
' - I -
a right to ~1 ;·ernPdy f,.Jr the injured, for we understand 
this Court 1 s in Le rpretation of ''wilful mis conduct, " as 
used in the statute, to n-1ean something less than an 
intentional wrongdoing, thereby bringing our statute 
within the holdings of the better-reasoned cases. 
What pLuntiff does contend is that the guest 
st-atute is in derogation, not only of the common law, but 
also of the Constitution. While under Section 68-3-2, 
Utah Code Annotated, 19S3, a strict construction of a 
statute contrary to the common law is not warranted in 
this State, we do submit that a statute adverse on its 
face to the clear rneaning of a provision of our Con-
s ti tu ti on, must be carefully applied, and strictly limited 
to those situations obviously falling within the wording 
of the act. The guest statute, substantially limiting the 
rights of a per::;on wronged to clairn compensation frorn 
the 'Nrongdoes, rnust be cautiously administered. A cau 
of action cannot fail because of the guest statute unless 
.:ill of t}1e prescribed conditions are rnet. It is a 
well-kno1.xJn princjp l (~ of statutory construction that 
possible. To i·1-_'.J.d i11L0 the statute interpretations and 
application::; contrary to the clear and concise wording 
of the statute \voulcl violate not only the obvious intent 
of the Legislature, but also ti1e protective and inalienable 
guaranties of the Constitution. 
The portion of the Utah guest statute here 
perLi.neLlt provides: 
''Any pecson who as a guest accepts a ride 
in any vehiclP, moving upon any of the 
publ1c highways of the state of Utah, and 
while so riding as such guest receives or 
sustains an injury, shall have no right of 
recovery against the owner or driver or 
person responsible for the operation of 
such vehicle ... " Section 41-9-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
The co11ditions thus required by this legislation are: 
Thal a guest (1.) Accept a ride in any vehicle, (2) Moving 
upo<1 any of the pul;Jic highways, (3) Receive or sustain 
an injury, (4) Whi.le ~.;o ··iding as such guest. Unless 
all four ccmdi.tion::; .:tre satisfied by the evidence in a 
particular c as c, the actio11 does not con1e within the 
statute, and the plainti.ff ia 110L dea1ed a right of 
u 
J -
redress, Pl;:irnt11L 11en, cunlt~nds that the instant 
siLuation does not rneet the second and fourth require-
inents, and U1at she is entitled to compensation. 
Because of tlle nun1erous decisions of the courts 
of various jurisdictions construing their respective 
guest statutes not al all consistent with each other, 
courtsel felt it essential to survey the guest statutes of 
the various states, to deterrnine the underlying reasons 
ior this inconsistency. See Appendix. Initially, it 
v1as of interest to learn that but 2 7 stales have guest 
statutes (the Ken tuck~, guest statute having been ruled 
unconstitutional in VanGalder v. Foster, 243 Ky. 543, 
49 S. W. L.d 352.). Of these, two states have statutes 
identical in wording Lo the Utah statute: North Dakota 
and Nevada. The rernainder have statutes broader in 
tt1eir applicatim1 than Lbe Utah act, since they do not 
require co1nphance ''~th as n1any conditions as are 
set forth in our stalt1te; 
l. The gnesl ,st~.d.utes oi Colorado, Delaware, 
Florida, Idaho, Kansas, !vfichigan, New Mexico 
j fl -
Oreuon, South C<-trol1n;i., South Dakota Virginia ~ . ' ' 
Washington, and Wyoming are identical. They provide 
that the defendant is not liable for injuries sustained by 
a guest transported by the defendant, except under 
special circumstan' cs. There is not requirement that 
the injury be inilicted while being trans ported or while 
the automobile is moving upon the public highways. The 
Texas statute is the sarne except that it adds ''over the 
public highways of this State. 11 The present Arkansas 
statule (the prior guest statute was rule unconstitutional 
in Emberson v. Buffington, 228 Ark. 120, 306 S. W. 2d 
326) is similar to the Texas statute containing no 
requirement that the incident occur while the guest is 
riding. 
2. Iowa, Montana, Nebraska and Vermont 
statutes all deny compensation for injuries sustained by 
a guest riding in the host 1 s vehicle, although their 
statutes do not specifir_:al1 y require the injury to be 
11 II "d' II Th occasioned while the guest is actua y so r1 ing . e 
Illinois statute is identical except that it also includes 
require th<tt the guest 1 s injuries be inflicted 11 while 
being transported11 before recovery is withheld, but 
include au incident::; whether tbe )' happen upon the 
_EJublic h::..gbways or cJsev,,here. 
4. An tr1teresting illustralion in the evolution 
law is presented [iy the California legislatures. Until 
1935 (the year uf the enactment of the Utah guest 
s tat:ute) the California guest statute was identical to 
the present Utah 5 tatute. Th,e 1935 California 
Legislature amended that provision, removing some of 
the con di. tions and making the statute broader in its 
scope. This statute was replaced with a new guest 
statute in 1959 which is the broadest in purview of any 
guest staLL1te cxam1nerL It precludes the guest from 
r•'CCO\;Cr\; frorn 1:1e owner or driver for inJ·uries - J ' 
suntarned bec;:::,use of the de1cndant 1s negligence, no 
matter \,vherE: :.Le <::tc Ltdent takes pJace or ~vvhether the 
guest is 111 , on c,r even o11tside th( vehicle at the time. 
- l 2 -
and per rnit re(' uveT y ,v] ,f· ;-'"' U1<~ defendant was intoxicated 
and/ or cornnnt led s u1 ,1e .Jct inure aggravated in nature 
than mere negligence. However, the obvious conclusion 
which is the product of the foregoing study is this 
caution: T}1at in exan1ini11g the case law of other 
jur1sd1ctions it is necessary· first to compare their 
guest statute with ours, and then tu make certain that 
proper distinctions are drawn. 
The immediate matter is one of first impression 
m Utah. Likewise, counsel is unable to find any case 
in North Dakota or Nevada {where the guest statute is 
identical) where the particular issue now before the 
Court was adjudic atc<l. The California courts did 
conside1 this very statute prior to its repeal, and 
therefore supply us \vjth the only case law construing 
a gue3t statute z1s lirnit1ng, frorn the standpoint of the 
p1otection afforded the defendant, as ours. 
The fiL·st case Hl \vl1ich the relationship was 
considered was Moreas v. Fcrrv, 135 Cal.App. 20 2 , 
2.6 fJ. ,'.cl 8thJ, VlH:CY!: Li:e plci_intif[ rode as ;:i_ guest with 
the defendant Lo :1 theiltcr. Tht:~ theater was crowded 
so the parties decided to go to another place of enter-
tainrnent. The defendant requested the plaintiff to crank 
the car. The plaintiff cranked, the crank kicked, 
plaintif£ 1s arin was Lnuken. The court held that under 
such cirr:umstances Lhic.· injury 'vVas not inflicted in any 
vehicle rnoving upon any higlnvay nor wl1ile the guest 
.l\lthough the cases con st ruing a guest statute 
identical to ours are lin1ited in numher, one was found 
right in point, and cornpletel y analogous in all pertinent 
particulars to the instant case. Prager v. Isreal, 15 
Cal. Zd 89, 98 P 2d 72.9. There the parties were on a 
trip. Midway they stopped the car, got into the back 
seat, and ate their hmch. Upon finishing, they were 
getting out of the l)ack seat to get into the front and 
resurne their Journey. The plaintiff was in the process 
of alighting from the ca1. With one foot on the ground 
and the other on tlte ru~1niic~ boanl the car began to 
pl<Hntiff ld lbc: g ruui1d and causing the injuries she 
complained of. The court s ai.d: 
11
The definition of the term 'guest' must 
be construed 1,vith the rest of the section 
in which it dppears. The first paragraph 
thereof sets forth the conditions under 
which the guest, so defined, will be denied 
re covP ry for injuries. Those conditions 
are: When a guest accepts a ride in any 
vehicle 'moving upon any of the public 
highways' and receives or sustains any 
injury 'while so riding as such guest'. 
It is clear that unless all of those condi-
tions a1·e s a tis fi ed the plaintiff is not 
such a guest as to he denied recovery." 
The court went on to say that a person in the process 
of alighting from an automobile, partly in and partly 
out when it begins to move, cannot be said to be 11riding" 
in said automobile within the meaning of the statute. 
Concluding; the court said: 
''Fllrthr:c nnore, we think it clear that if 
the defendant failed to park his automobile 
in .'iuch a rnanner that it was safe for the 
plaintiff Lo alight therefrom, or the auto-
mobile .,;vas in such a condition that it 
could not have been so parked, and the 
plaintiff suffered an injury in attempting 
to alight the refron1 as a result oi the 
s u.dden n1overnenl uf the automobile due 
' -·I
u t J '' d t· fend ant to properly 
::JC'i l1;· ~"llJ1i. ifw !_H·dkc:::;, he 'Nas guilty of 
.1.-~.,i1,:.:v11, ''· li sLtcft negligence was the 
_rno:.;.unaL· 'a11se of the injury suffered by 
rl1P pla:1:fjLf, she is entitled to recover 
d~nnages against hi1n." Emphasis added. 
There are but two differences rn the pertinent facts of 
the cited case and Lbe cdse now before the Court: In 
the Prager case fui-Ll1er journey was yet contemplated 
by the parties, ,vhf~reas here the trip had terminated 
five rninute s be fore the lnjur y was inflicted; and, in 
the Prager cdse tbe pla1nt1ff actually had one foot on 
the ground, 'Nhich ruay not have been the case with Mrs. 
Andrus. The California court, ho\-vever, made no 
distinction so fine that it depended upon the exact place 
of the plaintiffls feet at the time of the act complained 
oi. Rather, tbe court simply and correctly held that a 
gucs t 1 'atternpLing to alight' 1 from the automobile could 
not. be said to l.Je 11 riding" therein, and that the facts 
therefore were OLltside the guest statute. 
i\.ctuall y ~ it should be pointed out, the fact that 
Mrs. Andrus wci s i11 the process uf alighting from the 
reall:,r crit.ic<J, fo1 .tt the time the defendant was also 
outside the car, leaving the vehicle without a driver 
or operator. In coust.ruing tbe Iowa guest statute which 
p1ovides: 
'
1 The owner or operator of a motor vehicle 
sh;:il.l not be liable for any damages to any 
passenger or person riding in said motor 
11eh1cle as a guest or by invitation and not 
for hire ••• " Section 321. 494, Code of 
Iowa, J 962, 
the highest court of that state held that where the 
plaintiff, atten1pting to enter the automobile, was 
injured when the door fell off, she was not a guest 
within the 111eaning of the statute since the defendant 
vvas not in the car al the time, and since, therefore, 
the re was no driver operating the car. The journey 
could not start until Lhe driver was in the car, and 
until that time the plaintiff ~,v3.s not 11 riding in said motor 
vehicle'' driven or operated uy a driver. Puckett v. 
Pailthorpe, 20 7 lov,r;:i 613, 223 N. W. 254. Applying this 
- } c t it cannot be holding to the ca.se 110"\V beiore t le our ' 
-1 I 
said that Vt~·s. Andt u:-; 'Xds "so riding as such guest" 
in the defondantts auto1r2obile where the defendant was 
outside the car at the time of the wrong and resulting 
injury. 
In addition to the failure of the instant case to 
meet au of the conditions to the Utah guest statute, as th 
well-reasoned Prager and Puckett cases demonstrate, 
the plaintiff submits th..d.t there is further reason why the 
guest statute is not here applicable to deprive her of 
co1npensation for the injuries suffered and the expenses 
incurred. The host-guest relationship under the statute 
is in the nature of an implied contract, and the conduct 
and intent of the parties establish the status. It 
commcn<..:es w-ith the undertaking of transportation and 
terrninates upon arrival at the agreed or implied des-
tination. Owens v~ Young, 59 Wash. 2d __ ..... , 365 P. 2d 
774. Son1e cases have even gone so far as to hold the 
relationship suspended temporarily during the period 
after arrival at the primary destination and before 
beginning the return trip. Harrison v. Gamatero, 52 
-11}-
Cdl. App. !.d l iB~ lS/. P., Zd 904. Other cases have gone 
even further, holding that a ternporary interruption in 
the journey itseli, whether intended or not, suspends 
the guest statute until the ride is resumed. Ethier v. 
Audette, 307 Mass .. ill, 29 N.E. 2d 707 {where the 
parties,, enroute to plaintiff1s home, stopped at a 
-- restaura..D.t to pick up food); Roh:r v. Employers 
Liability Association Corp., Ltd., of London, 243 
Wisc. 113, 9 N. W. 2d 627 {where the parties were 
outside the auton1obile repairing a 'lat tire); Haskell v. 
Per-kins, 16 Ill .. App. 2d 4Z8, 148 N. E. 2d 625 (where 
the parties sto,?ped to assist a stranded motorist); 
Clinger v., Duncan, 166 Ohio St. 216, 141 N.E.2dl56 
(where the plaintiff left the car to see if another 
passenger was ready to go, and was injured while 
re -entering). 
In the case before the Court, the journey had 
ended live minutes before the negligent act of the 
defendant ;:end the accompanying injuries to the plaintiff 
were inilicted. With their arrival at the gate of Mrs. 
iL 
At t11a.t poiGt (1 f ;u- ;-iv al, the gr atuitoll$ right of the 
plaintiff expired and the i1nplied contract between the 
parties tern1inated. The subsequent act of the 
defend;mt constituting negligence was not performed 
in tr...c course of carrying out the gratuitous undertaking 
wl<.ich she had aS5luned. 
The hos r -guest relationship did not exist be-
tweeu. the parties at the time of the injury, and Mrs. 
Andrus is entitled to prosecute her claim against the 
defendant in the courts of this State. 
The cases cited in the Appellant1s Brief are not 
persuasive. Inasmuch as there is no guest statute in 
Massachusetts which the corresponding legislative 
reqnirements and conditions, it is impossible to apply 
the Slm<lry theories of the case law of that state to 
the prese11l situation which is controlled by enactment. 
The Ohio case cited by the defendant {Eskelman 
v. Wilson, 80 N. F:. Zd 803) points out the fact that 
every wonl in a statute must be given meaning if 
){' 
....._- __ \} -
pos:~ible,. The .__,-,ncl!tiun there required by the guest 
statute .i::; il1at the i~1jury take place while the guest was 
in or upon the rnotor \rehicle. Since the plaintiff in that 
case was two feet away from the car it could not be 
held that the ciLed condition was met, and she was 
permitted recovery. Of course, there is no such 
condition in the Utah statute, ai1d the fact that M1·s. 
P.Jldrut> was still partly in the car at the time of the 
defendantts negligent act is immaterial. 
Both of the Illinois cases rnentioned in the 
Appellant 1s Brief {Tallios v. Tallios, 359 Ill. App. 299, 
112 N .. E. Zd 723; Randolph v. Webb, 194 N.E.2d 379) 
are distinguishable on the fa1:ts. fo. both cases the 
injury occurred during the journey and while further 
trip was contemplated by the parties. The gratuitous 
undertaking of the defenilant had not ceased. The 
implied contract between the parties was yet executory. 
/As the Illinois court said, in the former case, the 
host-guest relationship "is not interrupted or terminatec 
by a tempora:cy aL;:;er .. ce frorn the conveyance for a 
re asu:1:inle dad u snal pu.rpo~e. •: It i,;l1ould also be 
rernembcred frat the Illinois guest statute does not 
require the iujury to take place while the guest is 
riding in the automobile nor upon the public highways 
of the state, and thus aifords much broader protection 
to the defendants and their insurance carriers than does 
thA Utah statute. The California case cited by defendant 
(Frankenstein v,, House, 41 Cal. App. Zd 813, 107 P. Zd 
624) is distinguished on the same ground. 
CONCLUSION 
At the rnornent of the commission of the wrong• 
ful act and the infliction of injury, the host-guest 
l:clationship previously existing between the parties had 
tenninated. The conditions of the Utah guest statute 
were not satisfied since the injury was not sustained 
sh.ile lvlrs. A.ndrus was 1 'so rirling as such guest" in 
a vehicle 11 rnoving upon any of the public highways, 
11 
but while she was attempting to alight from the 
driverless car of tlJe J(:}fendant. To deny the plaintiff 
her constitutional right of recovery would deprive the 
guesL statute of it::; .-1e:u an<i una1t1biguous meaning. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER and 
CRAIG T. VINCENT 
520 Bos ton Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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